B. Henry of Ghent’s Way of Positing it

42. In another way, [Henry] Quodlibet 5 q.13 - look for it.Henry ibid., “Now there is only a triple mode of existing in the universe of beings; for there is some being that exists in act altogether immutably, without any potency for change; and there is some being that exists in act altogether immutably, but is (as far as concerns itself) in potency for change if it were left to itself; and there is a third being existing altogether mutably in act and in potency. The measure of the quantity of existence (or of duration in existing) in the first way is called ‘eternity’ -and this, because of its ‘in every way immutable existence’, is necessarily a whole all at once, because as nothing is left to be acquired in its existence, so neither in its duration or eternity; and because of its lack of potency for change, it is of itself a fixed standing in the same way - for which reason the whole of eternity is nothing but a ‘now’ standing of itself immutably and indivisibly, not possessing parts., and it has, as far as concerns itself and the idea of its measurement, no idea of continuity, but only as to the consideration of our intellect in respect of and comparison with the succession of time. The measure of the quantity of existence (or of duration in existing) in the second way is called ‘aeviternity’ - which, because of its actual immutability, is necessarily a whole all at once, because nothing in the existence of what is aeviternal remains to be received; but because of the potency for change in what is aeviternal.it is not of itself a fixed standing, but is so only from another; not because it could be in the flux of a continuum, having of itself parts (as the ‘now’ of time can be), but because it can fall into, and it has a necessity of falling into, non-being unless it is conserved in being by another.; because of this, the whole duration of what is aeviternal is only a ‘now’ that stands, because of another, immutably and indivisibly, not possessed of parts.save by the extension of the intellect in respect of and by comparison with the parts of time. Now the measure of quantity (or of duration in existing) in the third way is called ‘time’ - which, because of the actual changing of the temporal thing (of which ‘time’ is the per se measure) is not a whole all at once but in succession, because in the being of a temporal thing (of which sort motion is) there properly remains always something to be received; and, because of the potency always mixed in with its act, it is always in flux (never a fixed standing), having parts that succeed to each other and never remain, in respect of which common difference eternity and aeviternity differ from time.” ¹⁴

43. Against this way of positing it I argue thus:

For he seems to contradict himself,Henry ibid., “Anselm [n.31] only says this in respect of the extension of time, namely because it is not true in their case that they should have in the following ‘now’ the being that they have in the present ‘now’, nor do they have now of themselves the being that they had before; rather, the being of a creature (as of an angel), as far as concerns itself, has to have a limit, but the being of God not at all. Hence the being of a creature is not had through continuous influx save by having a reference to the extension of time, as was said; also as concerns extension or process, eternity and aeviternity are differently disposed, because eternity is related to the whole of time as ‘not being at all able to fail’, but aeviternity can (as far as concerns itself) fail at any instant and be concluded under time - and thus, by reason of its potency for corruption, it has in some way the idea of what is temporal, which eternity has not at all.” ¹⁵ because if in aeviternity “it is not the case that an angel should have in the following ‘now’ the being he has in the present ‘now’ _ rather the being of an angel, as far as concerns itself, has to have a limit” (as Henry says expressly), and later he says that “aeviternity can, as far as concerns itself, fail at any instant” - then, if this ‘now’ of aeviternity have being formally along with the first ‘now’, whereby that being had to have a limit along with the first ‘now’ (according to Henry and his followers), then it must exist along with the second ‘now’ either by another being or by the same being posited again.

44. Further, as to his sayingHenry ibid., “For eternity, as the exceeding measure, contains virtually in itself the whole course of time, just as a superior creature contains virtually and in a supereminent way whatever there is in an inferior creature; so that, by positing eternity or aeviternity to exist in reality, not only is it impossible to posit that time in itself cannot exist..., rather it is incompossible to posit this once eternity or aeviternity have been posited to exist in reality. So the fact that from positing this impossibility, namely that time cannot be.(which is not only impossible in itself but incompossible with positing that eternity exists in God and aeviternity in an angel), the impossible conclusions [about aeviternity] in the four ultimate modes of unacceptability follow, is not surprising. However, they cannot follow from the fact that the ‘now’ of aeviternity is posited to be simple and indivisible, since this ‘now’ possesses virtually in itself its being extended, by intellect or imagination, to time.; but they all follow from the aforesaid not only impossible but also incompossible thing - by the opposite of which, once posited as necessary, namely ‘there is time’. the contraries of all those conclusions are very easily understood.” ¹⁶ that ‘there are impossible inferences which follow, and they do not follow from positing aeviternity as indivisible but from the denial of time, which denial is incompossible with the positing of aeviternity, and it is because of this incompossibility that the impossible conclusion about aeviternity follows’: this does not seem reasonable, because, according to him,Henry ibid. 8 q.9, “For nothing belongs to anything prior in nature which is not of a nature to belong to the same thing - as far as concerns itself - prior in duration.” ¹⁷ whatever is, as far as concerns itself, prior in nature can, as far as concerns itself, be prior in duration. So there is no repugnance for it in its being able without contradiction, as far as concerns itself, to be ‘prior in duration’ to the posterior (with respect to which it is said to be ‘prior in nature’) - and, when it is posited and the posterior is not posited, there is no contradiction on the part of what is ‘naturally prior’, nor on the part of anything that pertains to it insofar as it is prior.a Therefore, from such an hypothesis, there follows no incompossibility on the part of what is aeviternal insofar as it is aeviternal.

a.a [Interpolation] but the aeviternal and its proper measure are in every respect prior in nature to time, as foundation is prior to relation.

45. An example of this: that although the subject is necessarily followed by its special property, yet, because the subject is prior in nature, there is no contradiction on the part of the subject that it should exist prior even in duration to its special property; and if this supposition is made, no incompossibility follows on the part of the subject in itself as to the way it is prior to its property. Therefore if any contradiction does follow, this is through some extrinsic fact, namely from the relation of the cause to the effect.

46. So, in this way, if there were some necessary comparison of aeviternity to time, as of what is prior in nature to what is posterior in nature, then no contradiction would follow, because of negation of the posterior and positing of the prior, on the part of the prior in itself, nor on the part of anything that belongs to the prior in itself; but those inferences [sc. of Henry], namely that an angel ‘cannot be prior to another angel’ or that ‘an angel cannot be after its non-being’, are impossible per se on the part of the aeviternal as it is aeviternal;     therefore etc     .

47. Also, as to his proof of the necessity of the concomitance of time with aeviternity on the basis of the order of the more perfect to the more imperfect, it does not seem to suffice. For the proof would not conclude this about a quasi-quantitative containing but about a quidditative one, in the way a superior quiddity contains the inferior one; but with such containing there stands the fact that the superior can be without the inferior and the fact that the being proper to the superior may belong to it in the absence of the inferior, or at least need not belong to it in respect of the inferior. One must speak, therefore, in the same way about the issue at hand, that nothing proper to aeviternity belongs to it precisely in respect of time.